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Fiscal Reform in China: Implications for
Hong Kong
RICHARD CULLEN* AND HUA LING Fu.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Joint Declaration of the Government of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (Joint Declara-
tion)' concluded in 1984, scholars and commentators have devoted
considerable time studying the future of Hong Kong. Their studies
have intensified as the July 1, 1997 transition of Hong Kong into
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China (HKSAR) 2 approaches.
. This Article considers one aspect of the sovereignty change
that has been largely ignored: the fiscal relationship between the
HKSAR and the People's Republic of China (PRC). This topic
deserves careful study for at least three reasons. First, fiscal policy
and practice are crucial aspects of every political economy. Sec-
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1. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., 23 I.L.M. 1371 [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
2. The HKSAR will cover an area of approximately 1000 square kilometers. It will
take over the exact parameters of the present territory of Hong Kong.
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ond, as the HKSAR becomes the wealthiest component in the
post-1997 PRC, Hong Kong will find itself in an unusual position
of being an island of comparatively, great prosperity within the
poor though rapidly developing PRC.' Third, in late 1994, the PRC
introduced a series of momentous fiscal reforms as a key compo-
nent in its overall reform process.
Part II of this Article discusses the transition of Hong Kong
into the HKSAR. Part III reviews Hong Kong's basic fiscal
strengths and weaknesses. Part IV presents an overview of the
PRC's recent fiscal reforms. Part V examines the legal rules appli-
cable to the fiscal relationship between the HKSAR and the PRC
under the fundamental documents governing the HKSAR. Fi-
nally, part VI explores the wider political factors that may impact
the fiscal relationship between the HKSAR and the PRC. This
Article concludes that, barring exceptional circumstances, the
provisions guaranteeing the HKSAR's fiscal independence are
stringent and should prove effective due to their significant politi-
cal and economic underpinnings.
II. THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION3
The July 1, 1997 sovereignty change will occur pursuant to the
Joint Declaration4 which embodies the principles intended to
shape the manner of the HKSAR's governance for'the fifty-year
period following 1997. It is based on the Chinese doctrine of "one
country-two systems": although Hong Kong will become part of
the PRC (one country), it will retain a high degree of autonomy,
thus allowing it to maintain its current political economy (two sys-
tems). In other words, while the mainland PRC will continue to
practice "socialism with Chinese characteristics," Hong Kong will
continue to practice "capitalism with Chinese characteristics."
Although the agreements governing the changeover grant
Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, Hong Kong is not free to
determine its own future political and economic direction. This
3. The discussion of Hong Kong's fiscal position draws on arguments made in Rich-
ard Cullen, Looking into Hong Kong's Fiscal BaI4 11 AUSTL. TAX F. 511 (1994).
4. See Richard Cullen, Hong Kong Revenue Law: The Presen4 1997, and Beyond, 7
TAX NOTES INT'L 1109, 1114-18 (1993).
5. For an explanation of the background to and the process of evolving the formula
for Hong Kong's reversion to PRC sovereignty, see id. at 1109-18.
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autonomy merely grants Hong Kong the right to preserve its cur-
rent system. Hong Kong has no autonomy to develop, change, or
experiment. Ironically, post-1997 Hong Kong may not, for exam-
ple, decide to adopt socialism as the basis of its political organiza-
tion. The other side of this irony is that the more than nominally
socialist PRC has committed itself to the preservation of a dazzling
example of capitalism within its borders. The principal document
that will govern the HKSAR, and indicates that it will not adopt
socialist policy, is the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Basic Law).6
III. A FISCAL OVERVIEW OF HONG KONG
Hong Kong's fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31 of the
following year. Notwithstanding the political and economic for-
tunes of the previous twelve months, Hong Kong's stability and
prosperity seem assured every March as Hong Kong counts its
"loot" and announces the next budget. When former Financial
Secretary Sir Hamish Macleod introduced the expenditure and
revenue estimates for the 1995-1996 Hong Kong budget, he noted
that a regular problem for Hong Kong Financial Secretaries was
explaining larger than expected surpluses." Earlier in his speech,
Macleod discussed one of the fundamentals of the Hong Kong
government's fiscal policy: government expenditure must not
grow faster than the economy as a whole." A practical rule derived
6. Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Re-
public of China (1990), reprinted in 29,I.L.M. 1519 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law]. For
further comment on the fundamental political documentation for post-1997 Hong Kong,
see Yash Ghai, Back to Basics: The Provisional Legislature and the Basic Law, 25 H.K.
LJ. 2 (1995); Yash Ghai, A Comparative Perspective, in HONG KONG'S BASIC LAW:
PROBLEMS & PROSPECTS 1 (Peter Wesley-Smith ed., 1990); Yash Ghai, The Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion: Complementarities and Conflicts, 1 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 30, 40-41 (1995). Arti-
cle 5 of the Basic Law states that 'the socialist system and policies shall not be practiced
in Hong Kong." Basic Law, supra, art. 5, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519, 1521 (1990).
Moreover, paragraphs 3(3) and 3(5) of the Joint Declaration stress the requirement that
Hong Kong's legal, social, and economic systems be maintained after 1997. See Joint
Declaration, supra note 1, paras. 3(3), (5), at 1371-72.
7. See Budget Speech in Full, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 2,1995, at 6.
8. See id. Article 107 of the Basic Law further provides, inter alia, that the HKSAR
is to keep expenditure within the limits of revenues and avoid deficits. See Basic Law,
supra note 6, art. 107, reprinted in 29 IL.M. 1519, 1537 (1990).
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from this doctrine is that the government generally does not bor-
row.
Hong Kong's current Financial Secretary Donald Tsang, has
reason to express similar optimism.9 By April 1997, three months
prior to the July 1, 1997 sovereignty change, Hong Kong's fiscal re-
serves are estimated to reach U.S.$22 billion.'0 Combined with the
HKSAR Land Fund surplus, the total reaches approximately
U.S.$50 billion." This enormous sum does not include the ap-
proximately U.S.$50 billion in hard currencies backing the Hong
Kong dollar. Furthermore, Hong Kong's per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) is currently around U.S.$25,000. 2  This is espe-
cially impressive because Hong Kong, like Singapore, entered the
post-war period with a lower per capita GDP than India.1
3
Occasionally, the government does budget for a small deficit,
although Hong Kong typically has a budget surplus. Conse-
quently, stories on the government debt do not make headlines.
Hong Kong has a scheduler taxation system that is modeled
after a former British system. 4  The distinguishing features of
Hong Kong's taxation system are low tax rates and a narrow tax
base. 5 Rather than imposing a general income tax, Hong Kong's
system includes a series of separate taxes that apply differently to
various types of income.'6 The Inland Revenue Ordinance con-
tains the following taxes: a profits tax, which applies to trade,
business, and professional income; a salaries tax, which applies
mainly to wage and salary earners; and a property tax, which ap-
plies to property income. 7 Hong Kong also imposes duties on pe-
9. See Brian McLeod, The New Hong Kong, WINDOW, July 12,1996, at 32.
10. See Chris Yeung, Macleod Says SAR Funds to Hit $361b, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 2, 1995, at 1. Annex III of the Joint Declaration led to the Land Fund's crea-
tion. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, annex III, at 1380. Since May 1985, when the
Joint Declaration entered into force, the Hong Kong government has received consider-
able income from land transactions, which has been split equally between the government
and the Land Fund, which is for the use of the HKSAR government. See id.
11. See Yeung, supra note 10.
12. See Budget Speech in Full, supra note 7.
13. See David Kern, International Outlook, NAT'L WESTMINSTER BANK ECON. &
FIN. OUTLOOK, Oct. 1,1996, at 2, available in 1996 WL 9687079.
14. See Cullen, supra note 4, at 1112.
15. For a detailed explanation of the Hong Kong revenue system, see id.
16. See id. at 1121.
17. See Inland Revenue Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 112 (1989).
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troleum, alcohol, and tobacco products, as well as an estate duty8
and stamp duty'9 on instruments principally related to stock mar-
ket and real estate transactions. Other miscellaneous, taxes and
duties also apply to various transactions, such as a substantial duty
for registration of new vehicles. 0
Although disparities in wealth are egregious-for example,
Hong Kong has the highest per capita concentration of Mercedes
Benz cars in the world2 -most Hong Kong citizens have benefited
from the exceptional material progress of the city-state during the
last five decades.22 Mainstream Hong Kong residents pay little or
no tax, and enjoy cheap basic housing and rising real incomes.
The achievements of Hong Kong's fiscal system are impres-
sive: no government debt, very low taxes, massive accumulated
surpluses, improved basic social services, a quality educational sec-
tor, and one of the world's best urban infrastructures, including
mass public rail transportation and telecommunications systems.
Despite these achievements, commentators still criticize Hong
Kong's fiscal system. Their reproaches include the following: (1)
the taxation system's failure to address huge disparities in wealth,
(2) weak support services for the disadvantaged, including the
disabled, infirm, and elderly without families, (3) overcrowded or
expensive health services, (4) strains in the education system, (5)
neglect of environmental concerns, (6) infrastructure gaps, (7) lack
of adequate pension provisions, (8) inadequate control of some
governmental spending, and (9) the narrow tax base.2
Hong Kong's near constant high growth, as well as its lack of
political will, have reduced the visibility of a number of these con-
cerns. Although a low growth economy is not certain to develop,
the previous high growth rates will probably not continue.
Hong Kong's maturing economy Will exacerbate stresses that
18. See Estate Duty Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 111 (1983).
19. See Stamp Duty Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 117 (1986).
26. See Cullen, supra note 3, at 515.
21. See id. at 516.
22. Over the last two decades, income inequalities have tended to increase in the
West but decrease in East Asia, including Hong Kong., See George Enderle, An Out-
sider's View of the East Asian Miracle: Lessons and Questions, in WHOSE BUSINESS
VALUES?: SOME ASIAN AND CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIvES 87, 88 (Sally Stewart &
Gabriel Donleavy eds., 1995).
. 23. See Cullen, supra note 3, at 516-17.
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are currently manageable. The future poses significant demands
for increased government expenditure. Given that these demands
will relate largely to fundamental services, such as care for an ag-
ing population, the Hong Kong government cannot ignore them.
In addition, as new revenue sources become necessary, Hong
Kong's narrow tax base and low tax rates will be increasingly scru-
tinized. Hong Kong's restrictive position on government borrow-
ing and deficit financing may eventually require the use of tax re-
form to solve this looming expenditure growth. At the present
time, however, this fiscal rectitude has left Hong Kong's finances
in excellent condition, with reserves that are enormous by world
standards.
Like Taiwan, Hong Kong feels a need to maintain these cash
reserves as a bulwark against regional politics that could upset the
economic apple cart. A period of serious tension between the
PRC and Taiwan in early 1996 demonstrated the wisdom and ef-
fectiveness of this approach.24 Despite the most fierce episode of
sabre-rattling across the Taiwan Straights in recent memory, the
new Taiwan dollar and the Taiwanese economy pulled through in
sound condition.2
IV. FISCAL REFORM IN CHINA
A. Introduction
In late 1993, the PRC made the final decision on the basic
shape of its broad fiscal reform agenda. This crucial decision was
made at the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 26 It was subsequently
24. For a general discussion of the tension, see China's Foreign Minister: No Winners
From Taiwan Tension, DEUTSCHE PRESS-AGENTUR, Feb. 13, 1996, available in LEXIS,
World Library, AllwId File.
25. See generally Taiwan to Adjust Policy to Boost Economy, REUTERS FIN.
SERVICE, Apr. 20,1996.
26. See Jae Ho Chung, Central-Provincial Relations, in CHINA REVIEW 1995, at 3.5-
3.6 (Lo Chi Kin et al. eds., 1996). The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) is one of the key formal structures in the CCP's Constitution of the CCP.
See ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 70 (1992). In reality, the Political Bureau, or "Politburo",
and the Politburo Standing Committee exercise the "leadership" functions of the Central
Committee. See id. The State Council is the-title of the PRC's central government. See
id at 59; see also Du Xichuan & Zhang Lingyuan, CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM 52-66 (1990);
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ratified in March 1994 at the Eighth National People's Congress.2
It is probably safe to say that never before in the history of fiscal
policy-making has reform affecting so many people been adopted
in such a short time. The PRC comprises well over twenty percent
of the world's population, making it the most populous country in
the world. The reform is also significant because the PRC is now in
the midst of a rapid growth period with improving prosperity un-
precedented in the last 200 years "of its history. Nevertheless, the
PRC remains a country beset with enormous difficulties.
The commencement of the "open-door" policy in the late
1970s8 was, inter alia, a reaction and correction to the decade lost
to the Cultural Revolution.29 Following the adoption of this
"open-door" policy, the PRC entered an era of unprecedented
growth that has averaged more than ten percent per year for over
a decade." If it is able to sustain this pattern, this growth promises
to turn the PRC into the world's greatest economic power within
the next two decades.'
A main factor behind this growth has been the widespread
replacement of central planning in the economy with a reliance on
market factors. In the PRC, this change is often referred to as the
introduction of a socialist market economy. Crucially, this change
has involved delegating economic decision-making responsibility
to numerous individuals and group enterprises. 32 Although the
PRC maintains a large state enterprise sector (SES), the. impor-
tance of the SES has greatly diminished over the last two decades.
XIANFA [Constitution] sec. III (P.R.C.). Several striking features characterize the PRC's
political structure. As a matter of form, the government and the CCP are separate insti-
tutions. The CCP and the government are so closely intertwined, however, that it is diffi-
cult to determine where the CCP ends and the government begins. The need substan-
tively to separate the two is a matter of ongoing debate in the PRC. See id at 39-76.
27. See Chung, supra note 26.
28. For a general discussion of the 1970s open-door policy, see INT'L BUREAU OF
FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, SUPP. No. 4, TAXATION & INVESTMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 15 (1993).
29. The Cultural Revolution began in 1964 and aimed to reform the minds of the en-
tire nation, particularly intellectuals. See 0. EDMUND CLUBB, 20TH CENTURY CHINA
477 (1978).
30. See Chung, supra note 26, at 3.5-3.6.
31. See China Looming, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 1996, at 13.
32. There are still limits on just how large and independent private sector enterprises
may become. See The Excellent Chicken-Feed of Liu Yonghao, ECONOMIST, July 6, 1996,
at 59.
1997]
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The primary disadvantage of the SES, which still employs ap-
proximately 100 million people, is that many enterprises within it
are operating at huge losses.33 Because the SES operates as a giant
de facto welfare state within the PRC, the Chinese government
cannot allow it to deteriorate and deprive millions of citizens of in-
come, education, housing, health, and welfare services. If the SES
were fully exposed to market forces, the likely result would be
drastic social and economic disruption. 4
The move towards a market economy has dramatically ex-
posed the inadequacies of the old revenue regime. Throughout
much of the PRC's history, but particularly since 1979, the old re-
gime has been the subject of reform initiatives.35 Nevertheless, the
pre-1994 regime remained strongly influenced by its Soviet proto-
type in that it significantly reflected its reliance on the previously,
powerful, central control of the economy.36  With the move to-
wards a market economy, the PRC's entire fiscal regime showed
an obvious need for reform. In the wake of these economic
changes, the government's share of GDP expenditure has no-
ticeably decreased. In 1978, budgetary expenditures in the PRC
33. See Susan Fenton, China Sharpens Control Over Loss-makers, WINDOW, July 19,
1996, at 52. In 1995, 40% of SES enterprises had losses. See id Although the SES share
of total industrial output has fallen from 79% in 1979 to 38% in 1995, there are also some
real success stories in the SES. See id There is considerable debate about the exact
status of the SES: some economists argue that the portrayed peril is overexaggerated.
There is consensus, however; that overall, the SES is in poor economic shape and that its
reform is one of the major economic and social problems facing China. See Professor Ji
Liu, Pespectives of Economic Reform in China, Keynote Address at the Eleventh An-
nual Conference of the Chinese Economists' Society (Aug. 9, 1996) (transcript on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal). One tactic
for dealing with the problem, which seems to be having some success, is the merging of
successful and ailing enterprises in the SES. See Gerald Chen, Two Recipes for Ailing
SOEs, WINDOW, Aug. 16, 1996, at 31; Jean-Frangois Huchet, Old Age Pensions in China:
The Search for a National System, CHINA PERSP., July-Aug. 1996, at 18.
34. See Donald J.S. Brean, Financial Aspects of Fiscal Sector Reform in China, Paper
Presented to the Eleventh Annual Conference of Chinese Economists' Society (Aug. 11,
1996) (on file with author). If dependents are included, around one quarter of the PRC's
total population may still be reliant on the SES. See id
35. See Michel Oksenburg & James Tong, The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal
Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System, CHINA Q., Mar. 1991, at 1; see also
ROY BAHL & CHRISTINE WALLICH, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN
CHINA (World Bank Policy Research Paper WPS 863).
36. See Christine P.W. Wong, Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline:
The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China, CHINA Q., Dec. 1991, at 691.
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were thirty-nine percent of GDP." By 1994, budgeting expendi-
tures constituted fourteen percent of GDP, which is even lower
than Hong Kong.3 Simultaneously, the central government's
share of this component fell from sixty percent in the 1970s to
thirty-seven percent in 1993, posing serious implications for the
government's ability to implement further economic reforms. 9
Reforming the SES, in particular, will require the development of
an alternative welfare state system.
With these imperatives in mind, the PRC government em-
barked on its massive fiscal reform program in early 1994. The
revenue side of this program consisted of two principal elements.
The first element involved reforming the PRC's broad taxation
base. Existing taxes in the PRC were consolidated, further devel-
oped, or eliminated and replaced with new direct or indirect
taxes.0 These massive changes were principally designed to re-
move the old system's obvious drawbacks and establish a more
transparent taxation system capable of providing the government
with continuously growing revenue in the future. The second
principal aspect of the fiscal reform program was an attempt to re-
draw the fiscal relationship between the central government and
local governments in China.'
37. See id
38. See Brean, supra note 34;. Two qualifications need to be noted about these fig-
ures: (1) the impact of losses in the SES, and (2) the impact of extra budgetary items
(EBIs). Some commentators say that covering losses in the SES accounts for close to
10% of GDP and EBIs may account for up to another 10%. See A Funny-Looking Tiger,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 1996, at 17. Real government expenditure may thus be 30% or
more of GDP in the PRC.
39. See Brean, supra note 34. Some observers see significant economic incentives
from this apparent lowering of the government's profile. This reduction appears, how-
ever, to be more a matter of accident than policy, and most observers see the drawbacks
of the government's current weak fiscal position as outweighing any incentive benefits.
40. See generally Christine Wong, Fiscal Reform in 1994, in CHINA REVIEW 1995, at
20.1,20.3-20.4 (Lo Chi Kin et al. eds., 1995).
41. In many jurisdictions, the term "local government" indicates a small government
entity at the county, city, township,,or village level usually with quite limited responsibili-
ties. Discussions of the PRC's fiscal reforms, however, commonly use the term "local
government" as a global expression for a non-central, governing entity. Many other ju-
risdictions commonly use the term "regional government" to indicate this type of entity.
This Article uses the term "local government" in the global, PRC sense.
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B. Background of the Taxation System Reforms
1. The Political Geography of China
The PRC has been the world's most populous country for
much of recorded history. It has mostly been a unitary state, but
sometimes it has been a collection of several warring states.4
Notwithstanding its ability to maintain a united political structure,
the PRC also has a long history of administrative decentralization.
Given its immense size and population and the very early inven-
tion of proto-bureaucratic government during the Chou Dynasty
(1027-256 B.C.), 43 this decentralization is not surprising. The PRC
currently consists of twenty-three provinces,44 five autonomous
regions,45 and three central government municipalities." The core
of the current provincial structure was established more than 600
years ago during the early years of the Ming Dynasty.47 Beginning
July 1, 1997, the PRC will also include one special administrative
region: Hong Kong.4
The PRC also maintains a wide range of administrative units
below a province or an autonomous region. These third level ad-
ministrative units include prefectures, autonomous prefectures,
leagues, cities, counties, autonomous counties; banners, and
42. For example, the Warring States period at the end of the Chou Dynasty lasted
from 464 to 221 B.C. See FRANZ MICHAEL, CHINA THROUGH THE AGES 38 (1994). The
Three Kingdoms and North-South periods ran from 265 to 589 AD. See id. at 90-101.
43. See id. at 27-43.
44. The PRC always includes Taiwan in this total. See ATLAS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 34 (1989). The full list of provinces is: Anhui Province, Fujian
Province, Guangdong Province, Gansu Province, Guizhou Province, Hebei Province,
Hubei Province, Henan Province, Hainan Province, Heilongjiang Province, Hunan Prov-
ince, Jilin Province, Jiangsu Province, Jiangxi Province, Liaoning Province, Qinghai
Province, Sichuan Province, Shandong Province, Shanxi Province, Shaanxi Province, Tai-
wan Province, Yunnan Province, and Zhejiang Province. See id. at 4-33.
45. The most well-known autonomous region is Tibet. See id. at 34. The full list of
autonomous regions is: Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Nei Mongol (Inner Mon-
golia) Autonomous Region, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Uygur Autono-
mous Region, and Xizang (Tibet) Autonomous Region. See id. at 6,24, 26,29,37.
46. The three central government municipalities are: Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin.
See id at 3. They are soon to be joined by Chongging.
47. See MICHAEL, supra note 42, at 146. The Ming Dynasty lasted from 1368 to 1544
A.D. See id
48. On December 20, 1999, Macau will be added as another special administrative
region.
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autonomous banners.49 The adjective "a utonomous" identifies an
area occupied predominantly by one of the PRC's many minority
groups, which comprise about five percent of the PRC's total
population of approximately 1.2 billion people.50 The PRC's po-
litical structure also includes a fourth level comprised of town-
ships, nationality townships, and towns, all of which answer to the
counties and autonomous counties."'
The long established practice of administrative decentraliza-
tion partly explains the longevity of formal unitary government in
the PRC. Central governments throughout the imperial era were
usually politically wise enough to realize that central authority was
best ensured with strongly enforced central government restric-
tions. Other factors favoring a unitary state include: the largely
agrarian nature of the PRC's historical political economy, the
memory of havoc during periods of disunity, the ethnic and cul-
tural homogeneity of the majority of the population, and the re-
markable unifying power of the political dimension of the
"mandate of heaven" concept.12
2. The Failure of the Previous Revenue Regime
The PRC's old system relied on and was intimately linked
with the operation of a centrally planned economy, where virtually
all enterprises were either state-owned or state-controlled.3 In
this immensely complex system, different rates of indirect taxes
applied to products and sectors according to location. The tax ma-
trix, even under the centrally planned system, produced distortions
and wasteful industrial development.54 This system, which did not
really distinguish between taxes and profits in the dominating
public sector, has been aptlydescribed as "mushy."
55
The beginning of market economy reforms further exposed
49. See ATLAS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 44, at 1.
50. See id at 6.
51. See i& at 1.
52. See MICHAEL, supra note 42.
53. See Wong, supra note 40, at 20.2-20.3.
54. See id.
55. See Brean, supra note 34. For a "working" view of the old system, look at the
present-day Russian Federation. Since the collapse of the Communist Party tax reform in
Russia has made little headway. See id.
3991997]
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the old tax system's inadequacies. Moreover, high income tax
rates and differential tax rates based on the type of enterprise
produced both evasion and further distorted economic develop-
ment. The most significant failure was the breakdown of the sys-
tem concerning intergovernmental fiscal relations. Local govern-
ments collected virtually all taxes and remitted the funds to the
central government according to a formula. As more of the PRC's
economy slipped beyond direct central government control and
into local control, local governments had less incentive to gather
taxes effectively for remittance to the central government.5 6 By
the early 1990s, the contract based system of intergovernmental
fiscal transfers was also largely discredited.5
3. Pressures for Change
By the time the market- reforms were implemented, the pres-
sures made change inevitable. These pressures included internal,
as well as external pressureS on the PRC.
a. Internal Pressure
The pre-reform system was economically distorted and be-
coming increasingly inefficient in raising revenue. Moreover, it
was breaking down as the principal basis for intergovernmental
fiscal relations.
The widespread recognition of the need for reform in the SES
was another dominant pressure for change. The PRC faces huge
problems with the SES. On the one hand, it cannot simply stop
subsidizing the SES due to the immense potential for social dislo-
cation and political instability.58  Simultaneously, maintenance of
the SES exacerbates the central government's large budget defi-
cit. Due to its tendency to fuel inflation, this deficit may be a po-
56. See id.; see also Xuejin Zuo, China's Fiscal Decentralization and Local Services
Financing in Poor Townships (Aug. 9-11, 1996) (unpublished paper, 11th Annual Confer-
ence of the Chinese Economists' Society) (on file with author).
57. See Zuo, supra note 56.
58. See Brean, supra note 34.
59. This deficft has recently shown signs of slightly shrinking. See This Week,
WINDOW, July 5, 1996, at 2. This reduction is partly due to the voluntary movement of
employees out bf the SES and into the private sector. Over the last twelve months, the.
SES reportedly shed 10% of its employees. See A Funny-Looking Tiger, supra note 38, at
18.
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tential factor in increasing political instability. Although current
inflation appears relatively stable,60 no one has forgotten that a
surge in inflation played a significant part in precipitating the mass
protests of 1989 that lead to the bloodshed in Tienanmen Square
on June 4, 1989.6" Reform of the SES is simply inconceivable
without reform of the PRC's revenue regime.
Another major pressure for change comes from the problem
of regional disparities, .which fit into two broad categories: abso-
lute and relative deprivation. The first and most serious problem
is the absolute deprivation in certain, extremely poor regions of
the PRC. These regions are simply unable to provide basic food,
housing, health care, and education.
The second category of disparity may be termed relative dep-
rivation. Widespread concern and resentment exist in the PRC's
inland provinces, which relative to the coastal provinces, did not
benefit from the period of unprecedented growth due to the open-
door policy that began in the late 1970s. As a result of central
government planning, the benefits of the open-door policy have
frequently tended to favor specific regions in the PRC. For ex-
ample, the central government decided to encourage activity in
Special Economic Zones along the eastern and southern coasts of
the PRC because of their attractivenhss to offshore investors, par-
ticularly the "overseas" Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan and be-
yond.63  Areas in Guangdong Province, such as Shenhen and
Zhuhei and areas in Fujian Province, such as Xiamen, have some-
times seen spectacular rates of growth, while very poor inland ar-
eas have benefited far less, if at all, from the move towards a mar-
ket economy.A
60. See Tim Wilson, Full Yuan Convertability Moves Step Nearer, WINDOW, July 5,
1996, at 51.
61. See Morton Kondracke, The China Syndrome, COURIER (Louisville, KY), May 7,
1989.
62. See Wong, supra note 40, at 20.1; see also Zuo, supra note 56 (detailing the extent
of deprivation in a comparative case study between the prosperous Huacao Township in
the Shanghai Municipality and the Taiping Township in the Guangxi Zhuang Autono-
mous Region).
63. See Mark LaPedus, Hong Kong Electronic: Malaise, Opportunities, ELECTRONIC
BUYERS' NEWS, Sept. 27, 1993.
64. See Mark LaPedus, Contrasts Abound in PRC, ELECTRONIC BUYERS' NEWS,
Oct. 25, 1993.
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It is well-recognized that these disparities must be addressed.
The SES reform, however. may potentially further aggravate the
disparity problem. SES businesses provide the economic back-
bone in some of the PRC's poorer regions, such as the North-East.
There also are disparities within regions, especially between rural
and urban areas. For example, Sichuan, the most heavily popu-
lated province of the PRC, has average annual incomes that in the
countryside are one-third of 'average city incomes.65 All these
pressures have combined to generate massive internal migration in
the PRC. Due to the household registration system, most of this
migration is still not permanent.6
B. External Pressures
External pressures for fiscal reform came from a variety of
sources, including foreign investors in the PRC. Foreign investors
demanded greater clarity and transparency in the operation of the
PRC's revenue system. Advisors to the PRC government, such as
the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund also argued for comprehensive fiscal
reform.
C. The 1994 Reforms
1. The Reformed Tax Regime 6
In 1994, the PRC yielded to pressures for fiscal reform by an-
65. Sichuan, with a population of 110 million, has almost as many people as France
and England combined. See China on the Move, ECONOMIST, July 6, 1996, at 33.
66. See id at 33-34. Although it is now possible to move freely in the PRC, perma-
nent relocation is difficult and expensive. PRC citizens are entitled to certain benefits,
schooling for example, free of charge or at low cost where they are registered, but they
must pay for such benefits when received away from their registered home. As a result,
able-bodied male and female peasants, rather than entire families, migrate, while older
relatives and children usually remain at home.
67. For a comprehensive treatment of the new tax regime, see JINYAN Li, TAXATION
AND INVESTMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1995); JINYAN Li, CHINA TAX
MANUAL (1995). For an overview of the new tax regime, see Chung, supra note 26, at
3.9-3.17. See also Wong, supra note 40, at 20.3-20.4. For an English translation of all the
relevant tax laws, see A COLLECrION OF TAX LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1994). See also HOWARD GENSLER & JILIANG YANG,
A GUIDE TO CHINA'S TAX AND BUSINESS LAWS (1995).
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nouncing a series of reforms. The most important reform was a far
reaching value added tax (VAT). The new VAT replaced the old
product and business taxes with respect. to many services. The
earlier taxes included thirteen tax rates ranging from eight to
forty-five percent.68 The new VAT has a single basic rate of seven-
teen percent. Preferential rates, however, apply to certain agricul-
tural items and certain urban services, such as urban water sup-
ply.69  The new VAT also eliminated differential treatment of
domestic and foreign enterprises with respect to product and serv-
ice-related taxes. 0
The next principal area of reform concerned direct and in-
come taxes. The new general business tax eliminated the distor-
tions that occurred under the previous system where tax treat-
ments differed according to the owner of the business.7 ' This
reform has unified the tax rate on profits for state-owned, collec-
tive, and private enterprises. Furthermore, the top nominal tax
rate has been reduced from fifty-five percent to thirty-three per-
cent, while a number of other taxes have been adjusted and certain
concessions have been eliminated.7 Despite the introduction of a
unified tax rate, however, foreign enterprises and joint ventures
will still enjoy certain tax benefits during the transition period.
The new personal income tax replaced three former taxes.73
Chinese citizens and foreigners are now subject to the same
schedule.74 The tax rates range from five to thirty-three percent,
with only limited deductions and a tax-free threshold.75
Another new important tax was the consumption tax. The
consumption tax replaced the previous system of excise taxation.6
The consumption tax applies to a wide range of commodities, in-
cluding tobacco products, alcohol products, cosmetic products, pe-
68. See Allison E. Wielobob, China's Choice: Tax Incentives to Fund Economic De-
velopment, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 413,428 (1995).
69. See id. at 428-29.
70. See Wong, supra note 40, at 20.3.
71. See id. at 20.4.
72. See idt
73. See id China raises less than two percent of budgetary revenues from the indi-
vidual income tax. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id
76. See Wielobob, supra note 68, at 426.
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troleum fuels, and motor vehicles.7 Other new taxes include the
resource tax, which applies to natural resources including oil, gas,
coal, non-metal ferrous ores, and salt,78 and a new tax that works
much like a capital gains tax on land transfers.79 Other less impor-
tant tax reforms include land-related taxes, stock market transac-
tion taxes, an inheritance tax, and a stamp tax.80
2. Fiscal Layering
An important factor in'the design of the new broad tax base
was the element of fiscal layering. Outside the PRC, fiscal layer-
ing means the allocation of -taxation powers to different levels of
government." Different levels of government are given the right
to apply certain kinds of taxes and to decide the tax rate and the
appropriateness of concessions. These levels of government also
enjoy a certain amount of control over the spending of those taxes.
In the PRC, fiscal layering means the specific allocation of
rights to taxation revenues between central and local govern-
ments.8 Actual taxation powers are not allocated to local gov-
ernments, though they may grant some concessions when applying
certain local taxesYs' Instead, the central government gives local
governments the right to collect and retain specified taxes and to
share in other taxes.85 Local governments in the PRC thus lack the
fiscal flexibility that states in the United States of America, Aus-
tralia, and the provinces in Canada enjoy.
3. Fiscal Equalization
Under the previous fiscal contract system, sixteen budget-
deficit provinces received fixed subsidies from the central govern-
77. See id at 431.
78. See id at 427 n.176.
79. See id at 432.
80. See id. at 425.
81. See Tsang Shu-Ki & Cheng Yuk-Shing, Tax Break Dancing "China's Tax Reforms
of 1994-Breakthrough Compromise?," 3 ASIAN CENTURY Bus. REP. 82 (1994).
82. See Xiangyuan Jiang & Jack Huang, China on the Horizon: Exploring Current
Legal Issues, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 62 (1995).
83. See Shu-Ki & Yuk-Shing, supra note 81.
84. See Howard Gensler, Legal Aspects of Conducting Business in Asia, 8 TRAN-
SNAT'L LAW 103, 111 (1995).
85. See id. n.80.
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ment.86 By 1990, however, it was apparent that this system was de-
fective, and certain cities in the PRC began to experiment with dif-
ferent sorts of revenue-sharing arrangements.8 The tax reforms of
1994 reflected the lessons learned from this experience, especially
lessons related to fiscal equaiization.u
A major, though transitional, provision in the 1994 tax re-
forms guarantees to all provinces that revenues in 1994 and be-
yond would be no less than revenues in 1993.89 The central gov-
ernment promised to transfer any funds necessary to raise post-
1993 annual revenues to the 1993 levels. Given its greater role in
tax collection under the reforms, the central government's guaran-
tee of this base revenue level was reassuring. It should be noted,
however, that this guarantee is not indexed-it is only set at nomi-
nal 1993 figure. Therefore, although this guarantee is continuous,
the effect of inflation will make it much less significant with the
passage of time.
The central government included a provision in the imple-
mentation mechanism to prevent provincial abuse of the revenue
guarantee. The provision ensures that any abnormal surge in the
provinces' 1993 tax collection does not distort the base figure es-
tablished." Essentially, provinces suspected of "padding" their
1993 tax collections were given targets for revenue collections in
1994. If a province could not meet its target, its right to receive
central government transfers was affected.9'
4. Tax Administration
Another major component of the reform process has been a
major reorganization of the PRC's tax administration. Under the
old system, local governments collected all the sums remitted to
Beijing as taxes due to the central government. The new system
established a two-level system of tax collection.
In one level, the State Administration of Taxation's (SAT)
national tax offices collect taxes throughout the PRC while local
86. See Chung, supra note 26, at 3.6.
87. See id. at 3.7.
88. See id at 3.12.
89. See id. at 3.12-3.13.
90. See Wong, supra note 40, at 20.8.
91. See id
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governments simultaneously maintain a separate system of tax
collection offices 2  A principal reason for this reform is to im-
prove tax enforcement and administration, particularly for the cen-
tral government's benefit. In the long run, these reforms may
prove to be the most important because many taxes still go uncol-
lected in the PRC.3
5. Responses to the Reform
Reports indicate that both rich and poor provinces in the PRC
are concerned about the 1994 reforms.94 Other reports from Hong
Kong and Taiwan reveal several difficulties with implementing the
reforms.95 For example, the central government modified the tax
on land sales profits after strong protest from Guangdong Province
and the city of Shanghai.96 The government apparently agreed to
the modifications in the interest of maintaining investor confi-
dence.9
Another difficulty is that, in many cases, the provinces are
confronting severe problems in meeting expenditure responsibili-
ties using only the budgetary resources granted by the central gov-
ernment. To meet their responsibilities, the provinces rely heavily
on extra budgetary items (EBI),98 which include various levies,
charges, and fees for services, many of which lack transparency in
their devising and application." In some cases, EBI's may now ac-
count for the major component of local government budgets.'o
The lack of transparency of EBIs and their significant but uncer-
tain fiscal impact obstruct the goal of improved intergovernmental
92. See Brean, supra note 34.
93. See id An interesting experiment in improving tax collection processes, which
appears to be meeting considerable success, is currently underway in Uganda. Key com-
ponents in this plan include: carefully choosing tax officials to ensure personal probity,
paying tax officials Western-level salaries to attract the best talent and to put them be-
yond temptation, and providing money incentives for citizens to report tax dodgers. The
World Bank has hailed the plan. See Born Again to Gather Uganda's Tax, ECONOMIST,
July 27, 1996, at 38.
94. See Chung, supra note 26, at 3.12-3.13.
95. See id. at 3.17.
96. See id.
97. See id
98. See Zuo, supra note 57.
99. See id
100. See id.
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fiscal relations and create a "chicken and egg problem." The
budgetary demands and the restrictions on deficit budgeting often
lead local authorities to "innovative" revenue raising. The central
government, on the other hand, is concerned that its limited fiscal
equalization resources are distributed, as far as possible, on the
basis of genuine need. The EBIs make the task of accurately es-
tablishing need particularly difficult.
V. THE FISCAL RELATIONSHIP OF THE HKSAR wrr- THE PRC
After July 1, 1997, there will be concern over how much the
HKSAR's fiscal regime will have to adapt to adjust to the PRC's
1994 fiscal reforms. The formal answer is clear: the HKSAR will
not be required to adapt. The legal position concerning fiscal re-
lations between the HKSAR and Beijing is set out in the Basic
Law. Article 106 of the Basic Law provides that no PRC taxes are
allowed in Hong Kong.'O Further, HKSAR revenues are to be
used exclusively for HKSAR purposes and are not to be handed
over to the PRC. °2 In addition, article 108 of the Basic Law pro-
vides that the HKSAR will have an independent taxation system.1
3
Apart from these particular Basic Law provisions, the Joint Decla-
ration provides that Hong Kong's current legal, social and eco-
nomic systems are to be maintained after 1997."4
These Basic Law and Joint Declaration provisions have sig-
nificant practical economic and political underpinnings. Since its
inception in 1949, the PRC has benefited from Hong Kong's stabil-
ity and prosperity.0 5 As time has passed, these benefits have in-
creased significantly. Today, the continued growth of massive PRC
investments in the Hong Kong economy depend on Hong Kong's
stability and prosperity. The PRC is a major investor in all impor-
tant sectors of Hong Kong's economy, including banking, prop-
erty, aviation, and telecommunications.1 16 Moreover, Hong Kong
is the PRC's single most important source both for raising and
101. See Basic Law, supra note 6, art. 106, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519, 1537 (1990).
102. See id
103. See id art. 108.
104. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, paras. 3(3) & (5), at 1371-72.
105. See Cullen, supra note 5, at 1112.
106. See Skillful Master of the Balancing Act, ASIAN Bus., Sept. 1996, at 4.
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mobilizing domestic investment capital.' Thus, Hong Kong will
be especially important in future decades when the PRC invest-
ment program requires vast sums to implement more planned in-
frastructure development. In addition to the vast amount of direct
trade between the PRC and Hong Kong, the PRC also benefits
from the large flow of individual remittances from mainlanders
working in Hong Kong.
Because instability in Hong Kong will have enormous nega-
tive repercussions for the PRC, the PRC may risk serious destabi-
lization by blatantly circumventing the Basic Law provisions man-
dating the fiscal separation of the HKSAR and the PRC. Other
factors reinforcing the HKSAR's special separate status include:
the role of the HKSAR as a model for eventual reunification with
Taiwan, the PRC's strong nationalistic desire to see the HKSAR
remain a success in the world's eyes, the world's scrutiny of this
unique political experiment, and the proven resourcefulness and
resilience of Hong Kong.' Although it may be possible to find
subtle ways to circumvent the fiscal separation provisions in the
Basic Law,'9 there is no certainty that any such attempts are
planned. It should also be noted that the economies of, Hong
Kong and the PRC are closely intertwined. In fact, the PRC once
provided major assistance to Hong Kong's financial system after
the 1987 world stock market crash." Thus, an experience of recip-
107. See id.
108. For a discussion of these factors, see Cullen, supra note 5 at 1114-16. See also
Willy Wo-lap Lam, Beijing's New HK Policy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 10,1996, at
1.
109. Possible circumvention methods include the PRC leaning on the HKSAR to take
up PRC government bonds or to provide soft loans to the PRC. There has also been
speculation about the possibility that mechanisms may be found to transfer some of the
financial burden of stationing the People's Liberation Army Forces in the HKSAR.
Moreover, Hong Kong is heavily dependent on the PRC for the supply of basic utilities
like water and electricity plus food stuffs. It is conceivable that funds could be raised by
the PRC by the imposition of an export tax on services and goods flowing from the PRC
to the HKSAR. Such a tax would not appear to infringe the letter of the Basic Law pro-
visions on fiscal separation. Whether any such tax might contravene principles of inter-
national law (assuming the PRC becomes a member of the World Trade Organization) is
another issue. There is not enough space to discuss the issue fully here. For a more in
depth discussion of several of these issues see Jae Ho Ching & Shiu-hing Lo, Beijing's
Relations with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: An Inferential Framework
for the Post-1997 Arrangement, 68 PAC. AFF. 167,175 (1995).
110. See id.
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rocal fiscal support indeed exists.
The HKSAR was left out of the policy development process
in the course of planning and implementing the PRC's 1994 fiscal
reforms. In view of the legislative history of the Basic Law and the
Joint Declaration, this was not entirely surprising. Given the
enormous difficulties that the PRC faced in reforming its intergov-
ernmental fiscal relations, the isolation of the HKSAR from the
reform process suggests that the principle of fiscal separation car-
ries real weight, at least in the period leading up .to the change of
sovereignty.
In the event of some particularly pressing need arising in the
mainland PRC, such as a series of major natural disasters on the
mainland or the outbreak of serious hostilities between the PRC
and Taiwan, however, the HKSAR may be expected to assist the
PRC financially in ways not previously mentioned. In the case of
natural disasters, it is entirely reasonable to imagine the HKSAR
government offering substantial voluntary assistance. In the case
of serious hostilities, article 18 of the Basic Law allows the Stand-
ing Committee of the National People's Congress (SCNPC) to
apply Chinese laws in Hong Kong."' If the SCNPC decides that a
state of emergency exists in the HKSAR as a result of war or tur-
moil that is beyond the control of its government, Chinese laws
will be applied."2 In other words, if formal hostilities were to
break out with Taiwan, the Basic Law provides a formal mecha-
nism for overriding the fiscal separation of the HKSAR and the
PRC.
The possibility that the PRC may reach its borrowing limit
with the World Bank within the next two to three years is another
situation that may require Hong Kong's financial assistance. Al-
though the PRC's spending and repayment record'makes it a val-
ued customer, the World Bank usually cannot allow more than ten
percent of its total lending to be devoted to one country;13 the
PRC may hit this limit quite soon. Due to its chronic budget defi-
cit, the PRC relies heavily on World Bank loans and related soft
loans from the International Development Agency for its mod-
111. See Basic Law, supra note 6, art. 18, reprinted in 29 IL.M. 1519, 1523.
112. See id.
113. See A Problem with the Bank, ECONOMIST, July 13, 1996, at 32.
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ernization drive.114 If these sources dry up, the resulting budgetary
stress will trigger a search for cheap alternatives such as the
HKSAR reserves.
All the above instances that may compromise fiscal separation
involve exceptional circumstances. Under more realistic circum-
stances, however, it is clear that the HKSAR is designed to stand
alone economically. Thus, the 1994 tax reforms are likely to have
a less dramatic impact on the reform of Hong Kong's narrow tax
base. Rising expenditure pressures in Hong Kong makes this re-
form a matter of when rather than if. The PRC's formal tax re-
gime is more consistent with contemporary tax policy thinking
than is Hong Kong's tax system. In particular, the 1994 reforms
have stressed the importance of making full use of indirect taxes,
such as the VAT, when building a modern tax system. The lack of
explicit indirect taxes in Hong Kong stands in stark contrast to the
PRC. The PRC's shift of emphasis points the way for a major first
step in reforming Hong Kong's tax system.
Another matter worth watching relates to the likelihood that
Beijing will insist on being consulted on the contents of the
HKSAR's budget each and every year. Some speculate about
whether this process may be less than benign., It is certainly
likely that government procurement and tendering processes will
be influenced by the new relationship just as British contractors
tended to be well treated in such exercises in the past.
A final note needs to be made concerning the Double Tax
Treaties (DTTs) of the PRC. The Hong Kong government has
(and the HKSAR will retain) the power to enter into DTTs. Thus
far, Hong Kong has virtually no DTTs with other jurisdictions.
The PRC has signed many DTTs with other jurisdictions. Typi-
cally, these DTrs address cross-border taxation problems and is-
sues. There is a question, whether, after July 1, 1997, the PRC
DTTs will apply in the HKSAR. Although the matter- is not be-
yond doubt, the better view is that they will not apply. Accord-
ingly, the fiscal separation of the HKSAR within the PRC is un-
114. Seeid.
115. See The Fifth Man, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 1996, at 26.
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likely to be compromised via this route."6
VI. CONCLUSION
As Hong Kong prepares to become the HKSAR and join the
PRC, it finds itself on the brink of becoming part of an economy
that is engaged in a monumental fiscal reform program. This re-
form program is significant both due to its formal scope and the
conditions under which it is being implemented. These conditions
include the sheer size of the PRC, the economic underdevelop-
ment of this huge nation, and the urgency of the task. The
achievements to date are significant especially when one considers
the formal changes achieved through legislation and regulation.
Nevertheless, many difficulties remain. These difficulties include:
major tax collection and enforcement problems throughout the
system, the frightening budgetary problems facing many local gov-
ernments throughout the PRC, the almost insoluble problems of
the SES, and the distorting effects of the EBIs.
One of the driving forces behind fiscal reform in the PRC has
been the problem of regional disparities. For example, the income
disparity between poor -inner- regions and coastal regions has
reached as much as four to one."7 There are also major disparities
between rural and urban areas."
Following the PRC's 1994 fiscal reforms, the HKSAR's fiscal
relationship with the PRC looks more unusual than ever. The
unique fiscal position of the HKSAR is enshrined in the Basic
Law; the Joint Declaration further supports Hong Kong's special
situation. The legal guarantees are very clear. Moreover, the PRC
derives great economic benefit from a separate and prosperous
Hong Kong through investments, trade, provision of services, and
remittances. In addition, Hong Kong has been crucial in providing
and mobilizing the capital that has fueled the PRC's extraordinary
economic development since the late 1970s. Despite the predic-
116. The arguments for and against the possibility of the PRC D1.Ts applying in the
HKSAR are canvassed in Cullen, supra note 4.
117. See Ronald A. Edwards, Some Provincial Level Development Observations in
China (July 12, 1996) (unpublished paper, 11th Annual Conference of the Chinese
Economists' Society) (on file with author). In the United States, Canada, and Australia,
effective regional disparities are typically below two-to-one at their worst.
118. See China on the Move, supra note 65.
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tions of professional doomsayers, the legal guarantees and the
practical economic and political reasons for maintaining the
HKSAR in a stable and prosperous condition should allow it to
remain a separate fiscal island within the PRC, subject to the pro-
viso that exceptional circumstances may alter this outcome." 9
119. Well-known and highly successful contrarian investor, professional prophet of
doom, and Hong Kong resident, Dr. Marc Faber, claims that the PRC will certainly use
HKSAR revenues whenever the PRC needs money. See David Ibison, Moneymen Add
Up the Odds for '97, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 17,1996, at 13.
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